Designation of Members of Constitutional Bodies: A Comparative Analysis between Ecuador and Spain

Abstract

This article develops a comparative analysis between the constitutions of Ecuador and Spain, focusing on the mechanisms for designating authorities of the various constitutional bodies. The aim is to identify elements that can inform the debate on constitutional reforms in Ecuador. It examines structural differences in the legislative, executive, judicial, electoral, and transparency and social control functions, as well as the role of parliament, citizen participation, and the historical contexts of each country. The research concludes that the main difference does not lie in the number of recognized powers, but in the historical context in which each constitution was drafted. While the Spanish constitution (1978) trusted parliament as a space for consensus after a dictatorship, the Ecuadorian constitution (2008) emerged in an environment of deep distrust toward political parties, seeking to innovate with mechanisms of participatory democracy, such as the Council for Citizen Participation and Social Control (CPCCS). However, these innovations failed in practice, as evidenced by early reforms that restored prominence to representative democracy. The article reflects on whether it is more effective to reform existing mechanisms adapted to material reality than to introduce legal structures alien to the historical context and incapable of transforming it.